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Abstract 
Prior to the implementation of FAS 142 in 2002, goodwill was amortized annually. Now, 
companies with goodwill on their books must test it annually for impairment. This paper 
examines the effectiveness of goodwill amortization and impairment of goodwill both 
before and after the adoption of FAS 142 by analyzing their effect on abnormal stock 
returns. My results regarding the effect of goodwill amortization on stock returns are 
inconsistent, suggesting that goodwill amortization is not useful in determining the value 
of a company. My results also suggest that the stock market anticipates goodwill 
impairments before they are announced.  
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Introduction 
 Representation of goodwill on the balance sheet helps firms account for the 
intangible value (i.e. reputation, customer loyalty, brand recognition) in their company 
not captured by specifically identified intangibles. Intellectual capital that is represented 
in goodwill can be considered the most important asset of many of the world’s largest 
companies. The United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) 
as set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) outline standards 
regarding accounting for goodwill. As stated on the Financial Accounting Foundation’s 
website in the “About GAAP” section, the objective of GAAP is to provide information 
for firms that is useful for investors, lenders, or others that provide or may potentially 
provide resources. The information on financial statements that comply with GAAP are 
meant to be relevant, transparent, and consistent. However, the FASB still makes various 
changes to GAAP, indicating that it is still a work in progress and there is room for 
improvement. The FASB adopted a new standard regarding goodwill accounting in June 
2001, which was implemented starting in fiscal year 2002. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards 142- Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets (FAS 142) changed the 
accounting for goodwill. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of those 
changes and determine if the implementation of FAS 142 was effective in improving the 
relevancy, transparency, and consistency in financial accounting for goodwill. 
 Goodwill write-downs are so important in accounting valuation because they can 
be extremely large and affect stock market volatility. In 2002, AOL Time Warner Inc. 
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reported a $98.7 billion loss on goodwill write-down.1 While the size of this write-down 
was more than double the amount the market had anticipated, it was obvious that the 
value of the company was plummeting. The announcement of this impairment 
immediately caused AOL’s stock to decrease from $13.96 per share per $12.55 a share. It 
is a bit unusual for accounting values to be tied so closely with market valuation, since 
the events that led to the write-down of goodwill occurred before the announcement date. 
This paper will examine the effect of goodwill write-downs on stock returns using a large 
sample of firms. 
History of Accounting for Goodwill  
  In August of 1970, the FASB issued Accounting Practice Board (APB) 17: 
Intangible Assets. The opinion requires companies to record the cost of intangible assets 
acquired from others, such as goodwill, as assets in business transactions. Additionally, 
goodwill must be amortized over a period in which the benefit is expected to last, not to 
exceed forty years (APB 17: Intangible Assets 1970, 3). 
 The pooling of interests method as described in page 5 of APB Opinion No. 
16 allowed two or more companies to combine assets and liabilities without recognizing 
acquisition, which means goodwill would not need to be recognized. The FASB 
disallowed the pooling of interests method in Statement No. 141 in 2001, so that only the 
purchase method could be used to account for business combinations.2 Under the 
                                                          
1 Peers, Martin, and Julia Angwin. "AOL Posts a $98.7 Billion Loss On New Goodwill Write-Down." The 
Wall Street Journal. January 30, 2003. 
2 "Summary of Statement No. 141." Financial Accounting Standards Board. June 2001. 
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purchase method, the difference between the cost of acquiring a company and the sum of 
its fair values assets must be recorded as goodwill.  
 In June 2001, the FASB issued Statement No. 142, which revised the 
accounting for goodwill as it was outlined in APB No. 17. The FASB determined that 
goodwill that has an indefinite useful life should not be amortized, but instead tested 
annually for impairment.3 The statement also provides specific guidance for goodwill 
impairment testing in attempt to improve consistency across firms. The FASB argues that 
these changes will improve financial reporting by better reflecting the “underlying 
economics of those assets,” and subsequently, users of financial statements will have 
more accurate information on the value of firms.  
Current Knowledge 
 Existing literature suggests that investors seem to partially anticipate 
goodwill write-off announcements, as most of the negative valuation effects of 
companies with goodwill write-offs occurs before the announcement date (Hirschey and 
Richardson 2002, 187).  While some studies have shown that goodwill amortization adds 
no value to the usefulness of financial statements, others conclude that the elimination of 
goodwill amortization has resulted in inflated goodwill balances.4 Beatty and Weber 
concluded that the new standard has given managers some freedom of judgement to make 
                                                          
3 Financial Accounting Standards Board. June 2001. "Summary of Statement No. 142." 
4  Li, Kevin K., and Richard G. Sloan. "Has Goodwill Accounting Gone Bad?" SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011. 
Jennings, Ross, Marc J. Leclere, and Robert B. Thompson. "Goodwill Amortization and the Usefulness of 
Earnings." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000. 
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biased decisions on whether or not to make goodwill impairments.5 In Bens, Heltzer, and 
Segal’s 2007 study, they also found that FAS 142 makes it easier for managers to 
manipulate fair value tests of goodwill, so post-FAS 142 write-offs of goodwill are less 
informative to users of financial statements.  
 Many of these past studies fail to look at large samples of data after the 
implementation of FAS 142. In this study, I use data from before and after the adoption 
of FAS 142 and compare the effects of goodwill impairment announcements on abnormal 
stock returns. Overall, my results showed that the amortization of goodwill is 
insignificant and the announcement of goodwill impairments after the adoption FAS 142 
resulted in higher stock returns. This may be because investors are now more likely to 
anticipate impairments of goodwill since it is not regularly amortized. In the next section, 
I go further in depth on existing literature, then I go on to discuss my data set, next I 
describe my empirical strategy and how I interpreted my results, and finally I get to the 
conclusion. 
Literature Review 
 In his 2007 study, Chambers investigated the effect of the implementation 
of SFAS 142 on the accuracy of financial accounting of goodwill.6 He compared reported 
financial numbers from the years following the adoption of SFAS 142 with hypothetical 
numbers based on alternative goodwill accounting methods (Chambers 2007, 8). The four 
                                                          
5 Beatty, Anne, and Joseph Weber. "Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: An Examination of SFAS 
142 Goodwill Impairments." Journal of Accounting Research 44, no. 2 (May 2006): 284. 
6 Chambers, Dennis J. "Has Goodwill Accounting Under SFAS 142 Improved Financial Reporting?" SSRN 
Electronic Journal, April 2007. 
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different accounting systems Chambers examined were annual impairment testing with 
no amortization, systematic amortization with no annual impairment testing, a 
combination of annual impairment testing and systematic amortization, and neither 
annual impairment testing nor systematic amortization. The relevance of these systems 
was measured by the degree to which the financial statement numbers explain stock 
prices. 
 He found that annual impairment testing as mandated by SFAS 142 has 
improved financial reporting, but the elimination of systematic amortization has reduced 
the quality of financial reporting (Chambers 2007, 2). He concluded that on average, a 
goodwill accounting system that allows both annual impairment testing and systematic 
amortization, provides the most relevant accounting numbers. Firms with the most 
significant improvements using a hybrid system were mostly large firms with lower or 
negative earnings. His study demonstrates that the best accounting system for goodwill 
overall is one that allows firms to choose between systematic amortization of goodwill, 
annual impairment testing, or both (Chambers 2007, 3).  
 Jennings, LeClere, and Thompson (2001) examined the effect of goodwill 
amortization on the usefulness of earnings data as an indicator of share value for a large 
sample of publicly traded companies over the 1993-98 period.7 They ran cross-sectional 
regressions on earnings per share before goodwill amortization and on earnings per share 
earnings after goodwill amortization for each year in the sample period, and compared R2 
                                                          
7 Jennings, Ross, Marc J. Leclere, and Robert B. Thompson. "Goodwill Amortization and the Usefulness of 
Earnings." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000. 
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values between the two regressions (Jennings, Leclere and Thompson 2000, 22). They 
concluded that earnings before goodwill amortization explain significantly more of the 
observed distribution of share prices than earnings after goodwill amortization, and the 
goodwill amortization component of reported earnings adds no value to information 
available to investors.  
 In Hirschey and Richardson’s 2002 study, they considered whether or not 
goodwill write-offs represent important economic events for investors. Using a sample of 
80 goodwill write-off announcements by companies in the five-year period from 1992-
1996, they tested for robustness by obtaining three alternate estimates of abnormal stock 
returns surrounding the goodwill announcements.8 The estimation period used began 300 
trading days before the announcement date and ended 45 trading days before the 
announcement date. The study found that the valuation effects associated with goodwill 
write-off announcements are negative and material, typically 2-3 percent of the 
company’s stock price (Hirschey and Richardson 2002, 187). In the one-year period prior 
to announcement dates, negative valuation effects were -40 percent on average. Post-
announcement period valuation effects of -11 percent suggests that much of the negative 
valuation effects associated with goodwill write-off announcements are realized by the 
end of the announcement period. From this, they concluded that goodwill write-off 
decision are partially anticipated by the market or firms typically go through various 
value-reducing events during the pre-announcement period. 
                                                          
8 Hirschey, Mark, and Vernon J. Richardson. "Information Content of Accounting Goodwill Numbers." 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 21, no. 3 (2002): 180. 
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 Hirschey and Richardson (2003) extended their 2002 study by focusing on 
stock price behavior over long-term windows before and after announcement dates. 
Again, they used a sample of 80 goodwill write-off announcements made by U.S.-listed 
companies within the five-year period from 1992-1996 and used the same pre-
announcement estimation period as in their previous study. However, this time, they used 
a regression analysis to find that larger initial negative stock price reactions during the 
announcement period are associated with larger negative post-announcement period 
effects. This further supports their theory that investors initially underreact to the 
economic importance of goodwill write-off announcements.9 
 Li and Sloan (2017) examined the impact of SFAS142 on the accounting 
for and valuation of goodwill. They predicted goodwill impairments based on various 
balance sheet items, and compared the timeliness of goodwill impairments both before 
and after the adoption of SFAS 142.10 They found that goodwill impairments were less 
timely after the implementation of SFAS 142 and that the elimination of periodic 
amortization has resulted in relatively inflated goodwill balances and untimely 
impairments. Parallel to Hirschey and Richardson’s findings, Li and Sloan concluded that 
investors seem to partially anticipate goodwill impairments, but do not fully anticipate 
when they will be announced or the magnitude of the loss. Their results suggest that some 
managers have exploited the discretion allowed by SFAS 142 to delay goodwill 
impairments, causing earnings and stock prices to be temporarily inflated.  
                                                          
9 Hirschey, Mark, and Vernon J. Richardson. "Investor Underreaction to Goodwill Write-Offs." Financial 
Analysts Journal 59, no. 6 (2003): 83. 
10 Li, Kevin K., and Richard G. Sloan. "Has Goodwill Accounting Gone Bad?" SSRN Electronic Journal, 
2011. 
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 Beatty and Weber (2005) analyzed choice timing and placement of 
goodwill impairments on the income statement. They used a sample of firms from that 
they determined were likely to take goodwill write-offs from 2001.11 They examined the 
decision of firms to take a goodwill write-off, as well as the percentage of goodwill taken 
as a write-off. They considered debt covenants, market cap, and managerial 
compensation as driving variables for SFAS142 write-off incentives (Beatty and Weber 
2005, 269-70). They controlled for the firm’s economic environment, growth options, 
propensity to recognize special charges, and risk, since these factors were considered 
likely to affect the decision to make a goodwill write-off (Beatty and Weber 2005, 271). 
The results of their tests indicate that firms’ equity market considerations affect their 
decision on above-the-line versus below-the-line accounting treatment for goodwill 
write-offs, and their debt contracting, bonuses, turnover, and exchange delisting 
incentives affect their decisions regarding timing of expense recognition. They concluded 
that managers consider the presentation of expense recognition to be important, and that 
economic incentives affect “unverifiable fair value estimates” (Beatty and Weber 2005, 
284). They suggest that SFAS 142 requires managers to make unverifiable estimates of 
the values of firm segments, and subjective allocation of joint benefits associated with 
goodwill to the firm’s segments, and that these choices allow managers to make biased 
decisions on whether or not to make goodwill impairments (Beatty and Weber 2005, 
284).  
                                                          
11 Beatty, Anne, and Joseph Weber. "Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: An Examination of 
SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments." Journal of Accounting Research 44, no. 2 (May 2006): 267. 
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 Bens, Heltzer, and Segal (2007) analyzed the information content of 
goodwill write-offs before, during, and after the adoption of SFAS 142 by regressing 
goodwill impairments on abnormal stock returns.12 They also calculated an expected 
amount of goodwill impairment to analyze whether this has an effect on the market’s 
reaction. They found that before and after the implementation of FAS 142, when firms 
take an impairment loss that exceed the expected amount, the market reaction is negative, 
and when the loss is less than the expected amount, there is no market reaction (Bens, 
Heltzer, and Segal 2007, 20). They found following the adoption of SFAS 142, the 
market reaction to goodwill impairments is no longer significant, suggesting that the 
adoption of SFAS 142 has reduced the information content of goodwill write-offs, and 
fair value tests like that imposed in SFAS 142 are easier for managers to manipulate, 
resulting in less informative outcomes for investors (Bens, Heltzer, and Segal 2007, 27). 
 Existing literature fails to examine large samples of data for the years 
following the implementation of SFAS 142. I will use data from before 2002 and after 
2002, and include dummy variables for the implementation of SFAS 142. This way, I add 
to the literature by examining the overall effect of goodwill impairments on abnormal 
stock returns as well as the additional effect of the implementation of SFAS 142.  
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 Data was drawn from two different sources. Stock price data come from the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database, and financial accounting data 
                                                          
12Bens, Daniel A., Wendy Heltzer, and Benjamin Segal. "The Information Content of Goodwill 
Impairments and the Adoption of SFAS 142." SSRN Electronic Journal, July 2007. 
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are from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT. Details on the construction and 
characteristics of the sample are described in this section.  
 This combined data set is ideal for my purpose because the COMPUSTAT 
data includes detailed variables on accounting for goodwill (such as goodwill 
impairments, goodwill amortization, and total goodwill), important balance sheet and 
income statement values (for example, total assets, total equity, and net income), and the 
industry of the companies in the sample, while the data from CRSP provides information 
on the companies’ stock returns at various points in time. 
 Initially, 442,315 observations of data from public companies between the 
years of 1996 and 2018 were drawn from COMPUSTAT. I chose this time frame so that I 
could include data from both before and after the adoption of FAS 142. I also wanted to 
restrict the dataset to when substantial numbers of data points including valid goodwill-
related information are available. Before matching this data with financial markets data 
from CRSP, I eliminated observations from the COMPUSTAT sample that were not 
useful for the purposes of my study. After sorting the dataset by the global company key 
and data date, it was apparent that there were various duplicate data points in the sample 
where there was no recorded net income for one of the observations. I eliminated 37,727 
data points from the sample by dropping observations that had a recorded net income of 
“.” and also had the same global company key and data date as the preceding or 
following observation. 296,359 observations were dropped because they did not have any 
goodwill reported on their books and I did not want to skew the data by having too few 
observations in the sample with goodwill. I also dropped the upper and lower 1% of the 
15 
 
return on assets distribution to avoid potential bias from extreme outliers. Next, I 
combined the data from CRSP with this data set by matching the global company key 
with the year and month from the data date. Observations that could not be matched this 
way were dropped, and I was left with 57,772 observations in the sample. 
 The companies in the sample are a pretty good representative sample of the 
population since they are distributed among 72 out of the 99 SIC code two-digit industry 
groups. They are fairly evenly distributed among the fiscal years 1996-2017, with the 
exception of containing significantly less observations from fiscal year 2018, as shown in 
Table 1. Additionally, the sample size is large with 57,772 observations in the final data 
set. 
 I analyzed the effect of announced goodwill impairments and amortization 
on stock prices of x months after the announcement date. I controlled for normal 
variation in stock prices by using cumulative abnormal returns (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥) as my dependent 
variable, calculated as the cumulative returns that deviate from the industry average, 
where x is the number of months from the start of the fiscal year.  
 In order to standardize goodwill impairment and amortization amounts 
across companies of different sizes, I used goodwill impairments after tax to total assets 
ratio as an independent variable, as calculated below: 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
 
where gdwlia is impairments of goodwill after-tax and at is total assets. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Data Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Year - |
     Fiscal |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
       1996 |      2,284        3.95        3.95
       1997 |      2,459        4.26        8.21
       1998 |      2,460        4.26       12.47
       1999 |      2,400        4.15       16.62
       2000 |      2,291        3.97       20.59
       2001 |      2,312        4.00       24.59
       2002 |      2,787        4.82       29.41
       2003 |      2,864        4.96       34.37
       2004 |      2,950        5.11       39.48
       2005 |      2,967        5.14       44.61
       2006 |      2,984        5.17       49.78
       2007 |      2,910        5.04       54.82
       2008 |      2,629        4.55       59.37
       2009 |      2,562        4.43       63.80
       2010 |      2,556        4.42       68.23
       2011 |      2,522        4.37       72.59
       2012 |      2,541        4.40       76.99
       2013 |      2,584        4.47       81.46
       2014 |      2,729        4.72       86.19
       2015 |      2,685        4.65       90.83
       2016 |      2,648        4.58       95.42
       2017 |      2,540        4.40       99.81
       2018 |        108        0.19      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |     57,772      100.00
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 I also created a variable that considers the timing of the goodwill 
impairment announcements with respect to the implementation of FAS 142 in 2002, 
calculated as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 × 𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓142𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
where fas142dummy is equal to 1 when the year is 2002 or later (the start of the 
implementation of FAS142). This will allow me to see the additional effect of goodwill 
impairment announcements after FAS 142 was put in effect. When creating the variable 
for goodwill amortization, I first created an input variable for goodwill amortization in 
years where it was missing using the following formula: 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔40  
where gdwl is the amount of goodwill on the company’s books. This was done mainly or 
the purpose of having data for post-FAS 142 comparable to pre-FAS 142. Then I created 
a variable for goodwill amortization to total assets ratio with the formula below: 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
 
Similar to the FAS142 dummy for goodwill impairment, I created a variable that interacts 
goodwill amortization with the FAS 142 dummy using the following formula: 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2 × 𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓142𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
I also created a variable that measures total write-downs after-tax (excluding goodwill) to 
total assets ratio to use as a control, calculated as: 
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𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
 
where wda is write-downs after-tax excluding goodwill. I calculated a goodwill to total 
assets ratio as another variable to standardize the equation, calculated as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
 
To control for variation in size of the companies, I created a variable to measure the total 
assets in the company as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = log(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔) 
Return on assets was also used as a control variable and is calculated as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔 = 𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔 + 𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔 × (1 − (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔/𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔)). 5 × (𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔[𝑛𝑛 − 1])  
where ni is net income, xint is interest expense, txt is total income taxes, pi is pretax 
income, at is total assets, and n – 1 is the previous fiscal year. 
 Table 2 presents the summary statistics of key variables used in my 
regression analysis. The statistics show that a small fraction of companies in the sample 
recorded any goodwill impairments (less than 10%), while most of them (over 90%) 
amortized goodwill. Of the 57,772 observations in the sample, 5,506 of them recorded 
goodwill impairments, and of those goodwill impairments, 341 of them, or roughly 6%, 
occurred before 2002 (when FAS142 was implemented). Considering that about 25% of 
the data came from fiscal years 2001 and earlier, this is a small percentage and indicates 
that companies were more hesitant to announce goodwill impairments before FAS142 
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was implanted. Only 748 of the 57,772 companies in the sample did not amortize 
goodwill. Of the companies that did amortize goodwill, 13,690 out of 57,024 of them 
occurred before 2002, which is not unusual since roughly 25% of the data came from 
fiscal years 2001 and earlier.  
 Both of the FAS 142 interaction variables are biased downward since all 
the values from before 2002 are zero in each case. Summary statistics of the interaction 
variables not including the data points from before 2002 are presented in Table 3 and 
Table 4. Note that in this sample, the number of observations with goodwill impairments 
raises to 10% and the mean increases from .005 to .006. The number of observations with 
goodwill amortization raises to over 99% of the sample, and the mean increases from 
.004 to .005. 
 I trimmed the data to exclude outliers that would heavily skew the data by 
dropping data points in the bottom one percentile of goodwill impairments after tax to 
total assets ratio, the top and bottom one percentile of goodwill to total assets ratio, and 
the bottom one percentile of write-downs excluding goodwill after tax to assets ratio. The 
respective dummy variables did not need to be trimmed since the outliers would already 
be dropped. 12 observations were trimmed as outliers, and in my results sections I present 
the effect of including versus excluding these observations in my OLS regressions. I also 
used dummy variables for fiscal year and the 2-digit standard industrial classification 
(SIC) code to see if fiscal year or industry might have an additional impact on the effect 
of goodwill impairment reactions. In my results section, I present and discuss the effects 
20 
 
of including and excluding the trimmed data and the dummy variables for fiscal year and 
2-digit SIC code. 
 Table 5 shows pairwise correlation between my independent variables with 
the statistical significance level. It shows that aside from the obvious correlation between 
goodwill impairment and amortization and their respective dummy variables, the other 
independent variables are not too strongly correlated. This is good because strong 
correlation between independent variables could indicate multicollinearity, which would 
inflate the standard errors on the affected variables in regression results. Although the 
correlation is not strong, there is a statistically significant negative correlation between 
goodwill impairment and goodwill amortization. Goodwill impairment to total assets is 
positively correlated with return on assets, write-downs to total assets, and log of total 
assets. It is intuitive that if a company has goodwill impairments, it will also have write-
downs of other assets. However, it is interesting to note that the bigger the company and 
the greater the profit in proportion to total assets, goodwill impairments actually increase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Va
ria
bl
e
M
ea
n
SD
P1
P1
0
P2
5
P5
0
P7
5
P9
0
P9
9
N
GW
 Im
pa
irm
en
ts
/T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s 
-0
.0
06
0.
05
-0
.1
54
0
0
0
0
0
0
57
,7
72
GW
 Im
pa
irm
en
t x
 F
AS
14
2 
Du
m
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
-0
.0
05
0.
03
9
-0
.1
38
0
0
0
0
0
0
57
,7
72
In
pu
t G
W
 A
m
or
t/
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s
0.
00
5
0.
02
7
0
1.
93
E-
04
8.
28
E-
04
0.
00
3
0.
00
6
0.
01
0.
01
7
57
,7
72
GW
 A
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
x 
FA
S1
42
 D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
0.
00
4
0.
02
7
0
0
3.
18
E-
07
0.
00
1
0.
00
5
0.
00
9
0.
01
7
57
,7
72
Re
tu
rn
 o
n 
As
se
ts
0.
01
6
0.
17
6
-0
.7
2
-0
.1
22
0.
00
4
0.
04
9
0.
08
8
0.
13
3
0.
28
2
57
,7
72
GW
/T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s
0.
15
5
0.
15
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
9
0.
03
4
0.
10
6
0.
23
6
0.
38
1
0.
61
5
57
,7
72
W
rit
ed
ow
ns
 (e
xc
lu
di
ng
 G
W
)/
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s
-0
.0
02
0.
01
9
-0
.0
48
-0
.0
01
0
0
0
0
0
57
,7
72
lo
g(
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s)
6.
72
2
2.
20
9
2.
16
9
3.
83
3
5.
16
6
6.
66
3
8.
14
9
9.
63
2
12
.2
5
57
,7
72
Ta
bl
e 2
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
St
at
is
tic
s f
or
 S
el
ec
te
d 
Va
ri
ab
le
s 
G
W
Im
pa
irm
en
t/T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s i
s t
he
 ra
tio
 o
f g
oo
dw
ill
 im
pa
irm
en
ts 
a 
co
m
pa
ny
 to
ok
 in
 th
e 
gi
ve
n 
ye
ar
 to
 th
ei
r t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s. 
FA
S1
42
 D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
is
 
a 
du
m
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
th
at
 is
 e
qu
al
 to
 1
 if
 th
e 
ye
ar
 is
 2
00
2 
or
 la
te
r (
th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
ye
ar
 o
f F
A
S 
14
2)
. G
W
Im
pa
irm
en
t x
 F
A
S1
42
 D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
m
ul
tip
lie
s t
he
 G
W
Im
pa
irm
en
t/T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s v
ar
ia
bl
e 
by
 th
e 
FA
S1
42
 D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 fo
r t
he
 a
dd
iti
on
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f g
oo
dw
ill
 
im
pa
irm
en
ts
 a
fte
r t
he
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 F
A
S 
14
2.
 In
pu
t G
W
 A
m
or
t/T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s i
s a
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
th
at
 m
ea
su
re
s a
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
to
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s r
at
io
 o
f a
 
co
m
pa
ny
. F
or
 fi
rm
s t
ha
t d
id
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
bu
t h
ad
 g
oo
dw
ill
 o
n 
th
ei
r b
oo
ks
, I
 u
se
d 
an
 in
pu
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
th
at
 d
iv
id
ed
 to
ta
l g
oo
dw
ill
 b
y 
40
. 
G
W
 A
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
x 
FA
S1
42
 D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 m
ul
tip
lie
s t
he
 In
pu
t G
W
 A
m
or
t/T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s v
ar
ia
bl
e 
by
 th
e 
FA
S1
42
 D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 fo
r t
he
 a
dd
iti
on
 e
ff
ec
t o
f g
oo
dw
ill
 a
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
af
te
r t
he
 im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 F
A
S 
14
2.
 R
et
ur
ns
 o
n 
A
ss
et
s r
at
io
 m
ea
su
re
s t
he
 n
et
 p
ro
fit
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
a 
fir
m
’s
 a
ss
et
s. 
G
W
/T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s i
s c
al
cu
la
te
d 
by
 d
iv
id
in
g 
th
e 
to
ta
l a
m
ou
nt
 o
f g
oo
dw
ill
 o
n 
a 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 b
oo
ks
 b
y 
th
ei
r t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s. 
W
rit
e-
do
w
ns
 (e
xc
lu
di
ng
 G
W
)/T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s m
ea
su
re
s a
ll 
w
rit
e-
do
w
ns
 a
 c
om
pa
ny
 ta
ke
s n
ot
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
go
od
w
ill
 in
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 to
 th
ei
r t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s. 
Lo
g(
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts)
 is
 u
se
d 
as
 a
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
to
 e
sti
m
at
e 
th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
siz
e 
of
 e
ac
h 
co
m
pa
ny
. 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
ea
n
SD
P1
P1
0
P2
5
P5
0
P7
5
P9
0
P9
9
N
-0
.0
06
0.
04
4
-0
.1
82
-0
.0
07
0
0
0
0
0
43
,8
80
M
ea
n
SD
P1
P1
0
P2
5
P5
0
P7
5
P9
0
P9
9
N
0.
00
5
0.
03
1
0
6.
58
E-
05
0.
00
1
0.
00
3
0.
00
6
0.
01
0.
01
8
43
,8
80
Ta
bl
e 3
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
St
at
is
tic
s o
f G
W
 Im
pa
ir
m
en
t x
 F
AS
14
2 
D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
no
t i
nc
lu
di
ng
 y
ea
rs
 b
ef
or
e 
20
02
 
Ta
bl
e 4
 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
St
at
is
tic
s o
f G
W
 A
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
x 
FA
S 
14
2 
D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
no
t i
nc
lu
di
ng
 y
ea
rs
 
be
fo
re
 2
00
2 
Ta
bl
e 
3 
an
d 
Ta
bl
e 
4 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 to
 sh
ow
 th
e 
su
m
m
ar
y 
st
at
ist
ic
s o
f t
he
 g
oo
dw
ill
 im
pa
irm
en
t a
nd
 
go
od
w
ill
 a
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
FA
S 
14
2 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
va
ria
bl
es
 w
ith
ou
t t
he
 d
ow
nw
ar
d 
bi
as
 o
f t
he
 d
at
a 
po
in
ts 
th
at
 a
re
 z
er
o 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 a
re
 fr
om
 b
ef
or
e 
20
02
. 
23 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
G
W
 Im
p
ai
rm
e
n
t 
G
W
 Im
p
ai
rm
e
n
t
G
W
 A
m
o
rt
iz
at
io
n
G
W
 A
m
o
rt
iz
at
io
n
R
e
tu
rn
 o
n
G
W
 t
o
W
ri
te
d
o
w
n
s
lo
g(
To
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
)
to
 T
o
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
D
u
m
m
y
to
 T
o
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
D
u
m
m
y
A
ss
e
ts
To
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
to
 T
o
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
G
W
 Im
p
ai
rm
e
n
t 
1
to
 T
o
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
57
77
2
G
W
 Im
p
ai
rm
e
n
t
0.
76
76
1
D
u
m
m
y
0
57
77
2
57
77
2
G
W
 A
m
o
rt
iz
at
io
n
-0
.0
88
8
-0
.1
15
8
1
to
 T
o
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
0
0
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
G
W
 A
m
o
rt
iz
at
io
n
-0
.0
90
1
-0
.1
19
6
0.
99
64
1
D
u
m
m
y
0
0
0
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
R
e
tu
rn
 o
n
0.
28
14
0.
27
78
-0
.0
70
1
-0
.0
64
1
1
A
ss
e
ts
0
0
0
0
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
G
W
 t
o
-0
.0
46
6
-0
.0
50
5
0.
14
85
0.
12
15
-0
.0
40
3
1
To
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
0
0
0
0
0
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
W
ri
te
d
o
w
n
s 
0.
13
9
0.
16
78
-0
.0
62
4
-0
.0
64
3
0.
22
95
-0
.0
03
2
1
to
 T
o
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
0
0
0
0
0
0.
43
59
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
lo
g(
To
ta
l A
ss
e
ts
)
0.
04
77
0.
04
29
-0
.0
26
4
-0
.0
12
0.
29
11
-0
.0
15
5
0.
05
85
1
0
0
0
0.
00
41
0
0.
00
02
0
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
57
77
2
Ta
bl
e 
5 
Co
rr
el
at
io
n 
m
at
rix
 b
et
we
en
 m
ai
n 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
St
at
ist
ic
s i
nc
lu
de
 c
or
re
la
tio
n,
 p
-v
al
ue
 fo
r s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 o
f c
or
re
la
tio
n 
an
d 
nu
m
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
. 
 
G
W
 Im
pa
irm
en
t t
o 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s i
s t
he
 ra
tio
 o
f g
oo
dw
ill
 im
pa
irm
en
ts 
a 
co
m
pa
ny
 to
ok
 in
 th
e 
gi
ve
n 
ye
ar
 to
 th
ei
r t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s. 
FA
S1
42
 
D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
is 
a 
du
m
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
th
at
 is
 e
qu
al
 to
 1
 if
 th
e 
ye
ar
 is
 2
00
2 
or
 la
te
r (
th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
ye
ar
 o
f F
A
S 
14
2)
. G
W
 Im
pa
irm
en
t 
D
um
m
y 
is
 th
e 
G
W
 Im
pa
irm
en
t t
o 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s v
ar
ia
bl
e 
m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
FA
S1
42
 D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
V
ar
ia
bl
e.
 G
W
 A
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
to
 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s m
ea
su
re
s g
oo
dw
ill
 a
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
to
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s r
at
io
 o
f a
 c
om
pa
ny
. F
or
 fi
rm
s t
ha
t d
id
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
bu
t 
ha
d 
go
od
w
ill
 o
n 
th
ei
r b
oo
ks
, I
 u
se
d 
an
 in
pu
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
th
at
 d
iv
id
ed
 to
ta
l g
oo
dw
ill
 b
y 
40
. G
W
 A
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
D
um
m
y 
m
ul
tip
lie
s t
he
 G
W
 
A
m
or
tiz
at
io
n 
to
 T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s v
ar
ia
bl
e 
by
 th
e 
FA
S1
42
 D
um
m
y 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
V
ar
ia
bl
e.
 R
et
ur
ns
 o
n 
A
ss
et
s r
at
io
 m
ea
su
re
s t
he
 n
et
 p
ro
fit
 w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
a 
fir
m
’s
 a
ss
et
s. 
G
W
 to
 T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s i
s c
al
cu
la
te
d 
by
 d
iv
id
in
g 
th
e 
to
ta
l a
m
ou
nt
 o
f g
oo
dw
ill
 o
n 
a 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 b
oo
ks
 b
y 
th
ei
r t
ot
al
 
as
se
ts.
 W
rit
ed
ow
ns
 to
 T
ot
al
 A
ss
et
s m
ea
su
re
s w
rit
e-
do
w
ns
 a
 c
om
pa
ny
 ta
ke
s n
ot
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
go
od
w
ill
 in
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 to
 th
ei
r t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s. 
Lo
g(
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s)
 is
 u
se
d 
as
 a
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
to
 e
sti
m
at
e 
th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
siz
e 
of
 e
ac
h 
co
m
pa
ny
. 
24 
 
Empirical Strategy and Results 
In an attempt to determine the effect of my independent variables on abnormal 
stock returns, I created the following regression: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔_𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, 
Where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋 is cumulative abnormal stock returns from the announcement date of 
goodwill impairments and x is the respective month, gwiat_to_ta is goodwill impairments 
after tax to total assets ratio, gwi_dumm is a dummy variable that reflects whether the 
impairment announcement was in 2002 or later (when FAS142 was implemented), 
gwa2_to_ta is goodwill amortization after tax to total assets ratio, gwa_dumm is a 
dummy variable that reflects whether the amortization was done in 2002 or later (when 
FAS142 was implemented), roa is the return on assets ratio, gw_to_ta is goodwill to total 
assets ratio, wda_to_ta is write-downs (excluding goodwill) after tax to total assets ratio, 
and logta is the log of total assets.  
 In addition to the variables described above, I used dummy variables to control 
for industry group and fiscal year. In order to analyze the different effects of including 
and excluding these dummy variables as well as the data with extreme outliers that I 
trimmed as described in the previous section, I present OLS regressions with all the 
different combinations that include and exclude the three of those controls. I included 
regression results for months 1, 3, 5, and 9 to show the effects of goodwill impairment 
announcements over time. I found that using the OLS regressions for cumulative 
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abnormal returns for those months were a good representation of the sample of the 
preceding and following months. Table 6 shows OLS regression results from month 1,  
and Tables 7, 8, and 9 show results from months 3, 5, and 9, respectively.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table 6 
Regression results for CAR1 (cumulative abnormal returns for month 1) 
Reported statistics are coefficient and robust standard error. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
SIC Dummy No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes
FY Dummy No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Trim No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
gwiat/ta 0.015 0.017 0.03 0.016 0.029 0.018 0.028 0.031
(0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) (0.029) (0.029)
gwi FAS142 dummy 0.048 0.047 0.04 0.05 0.045 0.05 0.041 0.044
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053)
gwa/ta 3.74*** 3.89*** 1.32* 3.73*** 1.27* 3.88*** 1.28 1.31*
(0.537) (0.546) (0.72) (0.537) (0.712) (0.546) (0.712) (0.72)
gwa dummy -3.74*** -3.89*** -1.31* -3.73*** -1.27* -3.88*** -1.27 -1.31*
(0.536) (0.545) (0.719) (0.536) (0.711) (0.545) (0.711) (0.719)
roa -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
gw/ta -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
wda/ta -0.004 0.003 0.006 -0.012 -0.008 -0.005 0.0001 -0.002
(0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.074) (0.075)
loga -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
constant 0.04*** -0.001 -0.02** 0.04*** 0.01*** -0.001 0.01*** -0.02**
(0.003) (0.01) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.01) (0.005) (0.011)
R-squared 0.01 0.013 0.034 0.01 0.032 0.013 0.032 0.034
N 56,859 56,859 56,859 56,847 56,847 56,847 56,859 56,847
Gwiat/ta is the ratio of goodwill impairments a company took in the given year to their total assets. FAS142 
Dummy Interaction is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year is 2002 or later (the adoption year of FAS 
142). Gwi FAS142 dummy is the gwiat/ta variable multiplied by the FAS142 Dummy Interaction Variable. 
Gwa/ta measures goodwill amortization to total assets ratio of a company. For firms that did not have recorded 
amortization but had goodwill on their books, I used an input variable that divided total goodwill by 40. Gwa 
dummy multiplies the gwa/ta variable by the FAS142 Dummy Interaction Variable. Returns on Assets ratio (roa) 
measures the net profit in proportion to a firm’s assets. Gw/ta is calculated by dividing the total amount of 
goodwill on a company’s books by their total assets. Wda/ta measures write-downs a company takes not 
including goodwill in proportion to their total assets. Log(a) is the log of total assets. In this OLS regression, all 
of the above independent variables are regressed on CAR1, cumulative abnormal returns for the first month after 
the announcement date of write-downs. 
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Table 7 
Regression Results for CAR3 
Reported statistics are coefficient and robust standard error. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
SIC Dummy No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes
FY Dummy No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Trim No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
gwiat/ta 0.043 0.045 0.076 0.043 0.075 0.044 0.075 0.076
(0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.043) (0.047) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
gwi FAS142 dummy -0.004 -0.005 -0.034 -0.007 -0.035 -0.008 -0.032 -0.037
(0.07) (0.07) (0.072) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.072) (0.075)
gwa/ta 0.21 0.416 -1.358 0.222 -1.323 0.431 -1.324 -1.355
(0.721) (0.728) (0.97) (0.721) (0.963) (0.729) (0.963) (0.97)
gwa dummy -0.162 -0.369 1.413 -0.165 1.386 -0.375 1.379 1.418
(0.719) (0.727) (0.969) (0.719) (0.961) (0.727) (0.961) (0.969)
roa 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
gw/ta -0.02** -0.02** -0.01 -0.02** -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
wda/ta 0.04 0.045 0.08 0.041 0.077 0.046 0.076 0.082
(0.104) (0.105) (0.103) (0.105) (0.103) (0.105) (0.103) (0.104)
loga -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005 -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
constant 0.05*** -0.02 -0.05*** 0.05*** 0.01** -0.02 0.01** -0.05***
(0.005) (0.018) (0.018) (0.005) (0.007) (0.018) (0.007) (0.018)
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.023 0.002 0.021 0.005 0.021 0.023
N 56,495 56,495 56,495 56,484 56,484 56,484 56,495 56,484
Gwiat/ta is the ratio of goodwill impairments a company took in the given year to their total assets. FAS142 
Dummy Interaction is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year is 2002 or later (the adoption year of FAS 
142). Gwi FAS142 dummy is the gwiat/ta variable multiplied by the FAS142 Dummy Interaction Variable. 
Gwa/ta measures goodwill amortization to total assets ratio of a company. For firms that did not have recorded 
amortization but had goodwill on their books, I used an input variable that divided total goodwill by 40. Gwa 
dummy multiplies the gwa/ta variable by the FAS142 Dummy Interaction Variable. Returns on Assets ratio 
(roa) measures the net profit in proportion to a firm’s assets. Gw/ta is calculated by dividing the total amount of 
goodwill on a company’s books by their total assets. Wda/ta measures write-downs a company takes not 
including goodwill in proportion to their total assets. Log(a) is the log of total assets. In this OLS regression, all 
of the above independent variables are regressed on CAR3, cumulative abnormal returns for the third month 
after the announcement date of write-downs. 
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Table 8 
Regression results for CAR5 
Reported statistics are coefficient and robust standard error. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
SIC Dummy No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes
FY Dummy No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Trim No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
gwiat/ta 0.11* 0.11* 0.17** 0.11* 0.16** 0.11* 0.16** 0.17**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.069) (0.062) (0.069) (0.062) (0.069) (0.069)
gwi FAS142 dummy -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.29***
(0.104) (0.105) (0.108) (0.101) (0.105) (0.102) (0.108) (0.105)
gwa/ta 1.92** 2.13** -1.98* 1.93** -1.92 2.14** -1.92 -1.98*
(0.882) (0.885) (1.189) (0.88) (1.183) (0.884) (1.183) (1.189)
gwa dummy -1.57* -1.77** 2.29* -1.56* 2.25* -1.77** 2.23* 2.31*
(0.877) (0.881) (1.186) (0.876) (1.18) (0.88) (1.181) (1.186)
roa 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
gw/ta -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.043***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
wda/ta -0.30* -0.30* -0.18 -0.30* -0.18 -0.30* -0.18 -0.18
(0.163) (0.163) (0.155) (0.163) (0.155) (0.163) (0.155) (0.155)
loga -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
constant 0.06*** -0.02 -0.09*** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09***
(0.007) (0.032) (0.031) (0.007) (0.009) (0.032) (0.009) (0.031)
R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.029 0.003 0.027 0.005 0.027 0.029
N 55,691 55,691 55,691 55,681 55,681 55,681 55,691 55,681
Gwiat/ta is the ratio of goodwill impairments a company took in the given year to their total assets. FAS142 
Dummy Interaction is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year is 2002 or later (the adoption year of FAS 
142). Gwi FAS142 dummy is the gwiat/ta variable multiplied by the FAS142 Dummy Interaction Variable. Gwa/ta 
measures goodwill amortization to total assets ratio of a company. For firms that did not have recorded amortization 
but had goodwill on their books, I used an input variable that divided total goodwill by 40. Gwa dummy multiplies 
the gwa/ta variable by the FAS142 Dummy Interaction Variable. Returns on Assets ratio (roa) measures the net 
profit in proportion to a firm’s assets. Gw/ta is calculated by dividing the total amount of goodwill on a company’s 
books by their total assets. Wda/ta measures write-downs a company takes not including goodwill in proportion to 
their total assets. Log(a) is the log of total assets. In this OLS regression, all of the above independent variables are 
regressed on CAR5, cumulative abnormal returns for the fifth month after the announcement date of write-downs. 
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Table 9 
Regression results for CAR9 
Reported statistics are coefficient, t-statistic, and robust standard error. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
SIC Dummy No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes
FY Dummy No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Trim No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
gwiat/ta 0.082 0.082 0.146 0.082 0.147 0.082 0.146 0.146
(0.084) (0.084) (0.092) (0.084) (0.092) (0.084) (0.092) (0.092)
gwi FAS142 dummy -0.658*** -0.662*** -0.580*** -0.654*** -0.559*** -0.659*** -0.574*** -0.565***
(0.151) (0.151) (0.149) (0.154) (0.152) (0.154) (0.149) (0.152)
gwa/ta -2.434* -1.888 -3.361** -2.418* -3.548** -1.87 -3.522** -3.382**
(1.245) (1.248) (1.712) (1.246) (1.706) (1.249) (1.704) (1.713)
gwa dummy 3.099** 2.557** 3.914** 3.105** 4.101** 2.562** 4.073** 3.938**
(1.241) (1.243) (1.708) (1.24) (1.701) (1.243) (1.701) (1.708)
roa 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.129*** 0.107*** 0.129*** 0.105*** 0.130*** 0.128***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
gw/ta -0.082*** -0.099*** -0.093*** -0.082*** -0.079*** -0.099*** -0.079*** -0.092***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
wda/ta -0.801*** -0.801*** -0.587** -0.793*** -0.580** -0.792*** -0.584** -0.582**
(0.289) (0.289) (0.267) (0.29) (0.267) (0.29) (0.267) (0.267)
loga -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
constant 0.078*** 0.028 -0.022 0.078*** 0.027** 0.028 0.027** -0.022
(0.009) (0.045) (0.043) (0.009) (0.012) (0.045) (0.012) (0.043)
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.043 0.005 0.04 0.007 0.041 0.043
N 52,238 52,238 52,238 52,230 52,230 52,230 52,238 52,230
Gwiat/ta is the ratio of goodwill impairments a company took in the given year to their total assets. FAS142 
Dummy Interaction is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year is 2002 or later (the adoption year of FAS 
142). Gwi FAS142 dummy is the gwiat/ta variable multiplied by the FAS142 Dummy Interaction Variable. Gwa/ta 
measures goodwill amortization to total assets ratio of a company. For firms that did not have recorded amortization 
but had goodwill on their books, I used an input variable that divided total goodwill by 40. Gwa dummy multiplies 
the gwa/ta variable by the FAS142 Dummy Interaction Variable. Returns on Assets ratio (roa) measures the net 
profit in proportion to a firm’s assets. Gw/ta is calculated by dividing the total amount of goodwill on a company’s 
books by their total assets. Wda/ta measures write-downs a company takes not including goodwill in proportion to 
their total assets. Log(a) is the log of total assets. In this OLS regression, all of the above independent variables are 
regressed on CAR9, cumulative abnormal returns for the ninth month after the announcement date of write-downs. 
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The explanatory power of all of the OLS regressions are fairly weak, with none of 
the r-squared values exceeding 5%. This indicates that less than 5% of the variation in 
cumulative abnormal returns can be explained by the independent variables. It is not 
surprising that the model does not explain much of the variation in abnormal stock 
returns since we mainly analyzed the goodwill and total assets in a company. 
 The results from all four months suggest that the main effects of goodwill 
impairments are correlated with negative abnormal returns, noting that the impairments 
are negative values, consistent with previous findings in literature. However, this result is 
only significant in the fifth month after impairment announcements so we cannot 
confidently rely on this suggestion. The interaction effects with the FAS142 dummy 
show the difference in the effects of impairments from before to after FAS 142 was 
adopted. During the first month, the goodwill impairment FAS142 dummy interaction 
corresponds to the goodwill impairments to total assets ratio, but is not significant. At 
month 3, it is still not significant but starts to reverse at a very small rate so that abnormal 
returns are not as heavily affected downward by goodwill impairments. Beginning in the 
fifth month, the goodwill impairment FAS142 dummy interaction variable coefficient 
becomes negative in a proportion than the goodwill impairments to total assets ratio 
coefficient, suggesting a positive correlation between goodwill impairments and 
cumulative abnormal returns when the impairment was taken in 2002 or later, significant 
at the 1% level. This more positive reaction by the market to goodwill impairments after 
the implementation of FAS142 indicates that the market expects and accepts more 
goodwill impairments now than they did in the past. The common expectation of 
goodwill impairments may also imply that investors value amortization of goodwill. 
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When goodwill stopped being amortized after the adoption of FAS 142, investors seemed 
to expect it to be written down anyways. 
The trend of stock prices initially only slightly decreasing at an insignificant level 
after goodwill impairment announcements may indicate that the market already expected 
the impairment, and perhaps even drove it. A few months after the impairment (after the 
implementation of FAS142) is taken, the stocks tend to go back up at a higher rate than 
they went down. This may indicate that once a company recognizes a loss that was 
already expected and takes an impairment, the market goes back up because they initially 
overestimated the negative effect of the impairment. Perhaps if there was a way to force 
companies to take an annual write-down of goodwill, varying in size based on the current 
value of the company, the goodwill impairment announcements would not cause 
volatility in the stock market. 
Coefficients of goodwill amortization variables and their respective dummy 
variable interactions showed very inconsistent results across the different OLS 
regressions. It seems that in month one, goodwill amortization has no effect on abnormal 
stock returns after FAS142 was implemented. In the third month, goodwill amortization 
in years 2002 and later has a slight negative impact on stock returns, but the results are 
not significant. In years before 2002, the effects vary depending on which dummy 
variables were included and whether or not the data was trimmed. Months 5 and 9 show 
similar trends in regards to effects of goodwill amortization and the implementation of 
FAS142, but the results are mostly significant at the 10% or 5% level. These scattered 
results suggest that goodwill amortization may not be useful in determining the value of a 
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company. I should note that the amortization figures after FAS 142 were imputed to 
allow a common regression specification across years, and are likely subject to 
significant measurement error, which would tend to attenuate the results for this variable. 
The coefficient of the goodwill to total assets ratio is negative in all of the OLS 
regressions, and is statistically significant in most of them. This suggests that companies 
with a greater proportion of goodwill on their books tend to decrease in market value, 
perhaps due to the market predicting future impairments of goodwill. This is also 
consistent with the idea suggested in past literature that the stock market does not agree 
with failing to amortize goodwill in the post-FAS 142 time period. While the FASB 
argued that amortizing goodwill added no informative value to users of financial 
statements, the market seems to anticipate that goodwill will eventually decline.  
The presence of a fiscal year dummy significantly raises r-squared values of the 
OLS regressions. The inclusion of outlier from the trimmed data does not seem to have 
much of an effect on the r-squared values, coefficients, or significance of results. This is 
likely due to the fact that the data set contained very few outliers (12) and they come out 
of a very large sample size. The inclusion of dummy variables for the 2-digit SIC 
industry codes does not seem to have that large of an effect on the OLS regression 
results, suggesting that the industry group of companies does not significantly impact the 
effect of goodwill impairments on stock price.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this paper was to analyze whether or not the implementation of 
FAS 142 achieved its goal in improving the usefulness of information pertaining to 
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goodwill for investors by eliminating goodwill amortization and instead requiring annual 
impairment testing. Existing literature shows that investors already anticipate most of the 
deterioration in value of a company that will take a goodwill impairment before it is 
announced. Additionally, previous studies suggest that regulations that outlined in FAS 
142 make it easier for managers to manipulate earnings by using their biased judgement 
when deciding when to take impairments of goodwill.  
My study extends existing literature by examining a large sample of firms with 
goodwill on their books in years before and after the adoption of FAS 142. I analyzed the 
effect of goodwill impairments and amortization, as well as corresponding variables that 
consider the timing of those impairments and amortization with respect to the 
implementation of FAS 142, on cumulative abnormal returns of the companies’ stock for 
the months after those announcements. My results pertaining to goodwill amortization 
show inconsistent results on its effect on stock returns, suggesting that goodwill 
amortization is not useful in determining the value of a company. This result is consistent 
with existing literature, and supports the FASB’s claim that eliminating mandatory 
goodwill amortization will improve the usefulness of financial statements.  However, the 
stock market’s anticipation of goodwill impairments suggest that if a company has 
goodwill on their books, the market expects it will eventually be written down. Under this 
argument, perhaps a more efficient system would force companies will goodwill on their 
books to make a yearly write-down, varying in size depending on the current value of the 
company.  
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My results also suggest that the main effect of goodwill impairments (irrespective 
of whether before or after FAS 142) resulted in negative stock returns, the marginal 
impact of the interaction of the post-FAS 142 dummy with the goodwill impairment turns 
the stock return positive by the fifth month after the impairment. This result likely 
indicates that the elimination of goodwill amortization after FAS 142 has caused 
investors to better anticipate goodwill impairment announcements. However, if investors 
have already anticipated impairments of goodwill before they are announced, it does not 
seem like these impairments actually add value to the usefulness of financial statements. 
On the other hand, the result for the fifth month could indicate that investors take the 
impairment as a positive signal for future performance. That is, when managers decide to 
take a goodwill impairment, they are no longer attempting to hide a decrease in value of 
the company, but instead are taking steps to address current issues and move forward to 
improve the future performance of the company. 
In a perfect world, managers would not take advantage of a system that leaves 
room for judgement when determining the timing of goodwill impairments. However, 
past results and the results presented in this study indicate that the market already 
anticipates these write-offs, and management is likely choosing to delay goodwill 
impairments. Perhaps a new system that combines a systematic amortization of goodwill 
and annual impairment testing that can somehow be more subjective would improve the 
usefulness of financial reporting of goodwill. Unfortunately, the intangible properties of 
goodwill makes the creation of such a system seem nearly impossible.  
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 The results of this study are limited in that many of the coefficients of my 
independent variables were not statistically significant. Additionally, the data I used had a 
relatively small number of goodwill impairments that occurred before FAS 142 was 
implemented, which could cause bias in the results. The r-squared values in all of my 
OLS models were very small, all under 5%, indicating that a very small fraction of 
variation in abnormal stock returns was attributed to my variables. There are many other 
variables that drive stock returns that were not accounted for in this study, and it is hard 
to know if those variables might be correlated with goodwill impairment and 
amortization, which would cause bias.   
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